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INTRODUCTION
The question I address in this paper is: What is the cognitive or in-
formative value of sentences with indexical terms as used in a certain
context. The cognitive or informative value of a sentence is something
which someone who understands a sentence apprehends. We might
use here Frege 's identity criterion for propositions: two sentences have
different cognitive values if it is possible for someone to judge the one
to be true, and the other to be false (given that he has understood the
terms, and that no logical truths form part of the sentences; further,
the judgments have to be made at the same time). Indexicals are those
terms whose referent can only be determined given a context of speak-
er, addressee, time, positon, etc.; they may be pure ones such as 'I,'
'here,' 'now,' 'yesterday,' 'you,' in so far as it has the same sense as
'thou,' or they may be demonstratives such as 'he,' 'there,' 'this'; for the
terms of the latter category to refer, some kind of demonstration is
needed. In this paper I mainly deal with pure indexicals. First, I intro-
duce some problems which show that Kaplan's notion of character,
that is, the linguistic meaning of a sentence, is not always the right type
of entity to possess cognitive value. Next, I will bring some ideas of the
later Husserl to the fore which have bearing on these problems.
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Husserl's earlier ideas on indexicals, in the Logical Investigations, are
comparatively well known [Woodruff Smith and Mclntyre 1982,
Philipse 1982 and Mulligan and Smith 1986]. In the Investigations in-
dexical judgments are characterized as subjective, and they do not play
an important role in the philosophy of the Investigations in general.
This stands in contrast to Husserl's ideas on indexicality after the
Investigations, for then he considers all our empirical judgments to be
of an indexical nature. Unfortunately, Husserl is not very explicit about
his conception of indexicality after the publication of the Logical
Investigations. We have to rely on a rather short remark in his Formal
and Transcendental Logic, on a few manuscripts, and we have to extrap-
olate his ideas on the ego and those on intersubjectivity in the Cartes-
ian Meditations and his Crisis.
I CHARACTER AND COGNITIVE SIGNIFICANCE
Kaplan has introduced his notion of character in order to explain
the difference between the two judgments
{1 ) She is in danger
(2) I am in danger
in the following situation: Suppose I see in a window a woman threat-
ened by Dracula, and I judge (1); suddenly I realize that the vampire is
going to bite me, and I judge (2). Only then do I take the appropriate
actions. When we consider the Russellian proposition which has the
referent of 'she' as its part, there is no difference between the proposi-
tions expressed, for the referent of 'I' is the same as the referent of
'she.' In Kaplan's terminology, the content of the two judgments is the
same; therefore, the truth-value of the two sentences is the same.
Because the contents do not differ, it is not the content which can ex-
plain why there is a difference in cognitive value between the two sen-
tences. The character, the constant linguistic meaning, of 'I' is differ-
ent, though, from the character of 'she'; each presents the content in
a different manner. This explains why different actions follow in case
I judge (2) instead of ( 1). Kaplan defines character as a function that
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takes us from contexts to contents. But he also confesses that equiva-
lent characters are represented by the same function, which means that
equivalent characters are identified by this definition.
This notion of character must be understood in the sense that differ-
ent contents might be given under the same character. Kaplan gives
the following example: Castor and Pollux both make the judgment 'My
brother was born before I was.' Only one of these judgments can be
true, so their contents clearly must be different. In so far as the two
sentences are tokens of the same type, their characters are the same.
According to Kaplan, the character of a word or sentence can be iden-
tified with its cognitive significance. This, I think, can be unproblem-
atically done in most cases, namely if we do not take indexical sen-
tences into consideration. But if we do so, characters are not enough:
When I say today 'Tomorrow I will stop smoking'; and, tomorrow I ut-
ter the same words, it hardly can be said that my intentions are still the
same. Although it seems that these cases can be solved by bringing in
the content of a judgment or an intention, I think this will not do. My
judgment or intention need not involve any exact date. You can per-
fectly understand what my intentions are, without knowing the exact
date of tomorrow.
In the case of the sentence-type, 'My brother was born before I was,'
where indexicals are involved, Kaplan identifies character with some-
thing he calls 'cognitive state,' or 'cognitive content.' In general, he
conceives of the character as being what gives cognitive significance to
a sentence or judgment; character belongs to a sentence-type. So, for
Kaplan, the cognitive significance of the two judgments made by
Castor and Pollux is the same.
On my conception of cognitive significance, the cognitive signifi-
cance of the two judgments made by Castor and Pollux is not the
same, which means that character and cognitive significance cannot be
identified. I think that the cognitive significance of a sentence must be
something that can explain communication. It should explain that you
and I can apprehend the same thought or proposition together with its
cognitive value, although we have to use different signs, with their dif-
ferent linguistic meanings, to express the same proposition. Also, I be-
lieve that it is important that our conception of proposition and cogni-
tive value can help us to guarantee that the same proposition can be
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expressed at a later time. This means that I will criticize Kaplan's no-
tions of character and cognitive significance.'' It will turn out that
Kaplan's notion of cognitive significance is too coarse, when it is con-
ceived of as a function form contexts to contents, or that it is too sub-
jective, just like Perry's belief-state [Perry 1979]. Cognitive significance
should neither be explained by appeal to entities which are completely
independent of our judging and believing, as Frege did with his notion
of Sinn in 'Der Gedanke.' Nor should it be explained in such a way
that communication and retainment of belief are impossible in the
case of indexical sentences. What I am looking for is a notion of cogni-
tive significance which is neither absolute, nor subjective.
II COMMMUNICATION AND RETAINMENT OF BELIEF
The examples I take as paradigmatic are not those of a speaker ex-
pressing his beliefs, but those in which people are communicating. The
most simple case is a dialogue. I can use sentence (1) and (2), again.
Suppose a friend of mine is passing by and sees what is going to hap-
pen. At that moment I only believe that the woman in the window is in
danger, and judge ( 1); I do not hold (2) to be true. My friend does not
want me to be kissed by Dracula, and says to me: (3) 'You are in dan-
ger (Dracula is going to bite you).' Now, when has my friend succeed-
ed in giving me the information he wants me to have;2 when has there
been real communication? When do we have the same belief, not in
the sense in which our psychological states are the same, but in the
sense that we have the same opinion or knowledge. It is not enough
that the content of my judgment is the same as his, for in the case
I judge 'she is in danger,' and act according to it, that is, do not act at
all, my friend will conclude that I have not got his message. He will re-
peat (3), and address me more explicitly. Neither can we say that the
characters or belief-states must be the same, in order that communica-
tion succeeds: one sentence has the character of 'you' as its part, the
other the character of 'I.' The question is: What is needed in order for
communication to succeed, in order that J receive the appropriate in-
formation?
Let me take another example, using the following sentences:
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(4) It is raining here
(5) It is raining there
(6) It is raining in Singapore
Suppose my lover is travelling all over the world. Unbeknown to me,
he happens to be in Singapore this very moment, and is making
a phone-call with me. He utters (4), and all he wants to inform me
about is that it is raining where he is-this information differs, for ex-
ample, from the information he gives to the weather-forcast station for
which he is working. (It might even be the case that he actually does
not want me to know that he is in Singapore, because he once has had
a girl-friend there, and knows me to be jealous.) If I have understood
him well, I judge (5). (6) I can judge only after I have received the in-
formation that my lover is in Singapore, and have made the appropri-
ate inference. The information of (6) is not contained in that of (4).
Or, someone reporting my belief should not say 'She believes that it is
raining in Singapore,' when he wants to report my saying (4). Ac-
cording to Kaplan, the contents of sentence (4)-(6) are the same,
whereas their chararacters differ. This means that the notions of char-
acter and content are not enough to explain that (4) and (5) have some-
thing in common, which they do not share with (6).
My criticism of the theories which only distinguish character and
content also applies to judgments standing on their own, namely in so
far as they involve belief-reports.3 In reporting a belief, an 'I', for exam-
ple, must systematically be replaced by a 'you,' and a 'here' by a 'there.'
m HUSSERL'S LATER IDEAS ON INDEXICALS
Husserl's later theory of indexicals is of importance, because there
he no longer has a subjective conception of indexicals. At the same
time, he takes all our empirical judgments to be of an essentially index-
ical nature. The later Husserl has a theory of intersubjectivity and of
orientation in space and time, which does not make an appeal to enti-
ties existing independently of a living and judging person. He takes re-
ally seriously the relation between speaker and hearer, that is, between
the meaning of 'I' and 'you,' of 'here' and 'there.' of 'now' and 'then.'
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Husserl's later theory of indexicals can be divided into five mo-
ments:
( 1 ) the notion of horizon;
(2) the acting and moving body as orientation-centre;
(3) space and time possess no intrinsic differences.
These three moments lead to the idea that all objects are perceived as
part of a perceptual field, and that all our judgments are indexical. All
judgments seem to be subjective, now. Therefore, we need two more
moments:
(4) the constitution of another ego;
(5) horizonal intentionality/ situation-horizon.
The last moment gives intersubjective meaning to indexical judgments
in constituting the intersubjectvie world as we experience it, what is
known as the Lebenswelt.
When we perceive an object, it belongs essentially to such a percep-
tion that it is possible to have other perceptions of that object accord-
ing to its type. When we perceive something as a house, there is a hori-
zon of perceptions involving other sides of it. The objectual horizon is
a correlate of such horizonal acts. Besides the inner-horizon of an ob-
ject (for example, the other sides of the house), there is also an outer-
horizon of this object consisting in the relations this object has to oth-
er objects (relations of this house to the trees and the other houses sur-
rounding it) [Husserl 1987, § 19, Husserl 1962, § 47].
In a manuscript, dated May 1912 [Husserl 1976], Husserl defends
the thesis that all empirical judgments, that is, all judgments about the
spatio-temporal world are tied to experiential acts, and, as such, con-
tain indexical elements. Even universal judgments, such as 'All bodies
have weight,' have a horizon of experience tied to a here and now of
the judging person. The point of reference of empirical judgments is
the experiencing body (der Leib als Orientierungszentrum, als Null-
punkt) which constitutes an oriented, egocentric space by moving
around. Via the experiencing and moving body there is a system of ac-
tual and possible perceptions intrinsic to a given perception: a percep-
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tuai field [Husserl 1985, § 8, 22]. "Alles Räumliche ist ein Dort zum
Hier in dreidimensionaler Mannigfaltigkeit", as Husserl says [Husserl
1976, p. 522; see also Schuhmann 1993, pp. 120-2).
How, then, can these empirical judgments, which are rooted in ori-
ented, egocentric space of persons ever become objective? How can we
ever understand each others judgments, if they are ego-oriented? In the
above-mentioned manuscript Husserl says to this: Just in so far as
there are between my orientations and those of others certain ex-
change-relations (Altstauschbeziehungen), which everyone can appre-
hend from his own orientation, only so far is there understanding and
is intersubjective judging possible.
Only much later, in the fifth Cartesian Meditation, is this idea given
depth by the constitution of the alter ego. The other is not just an ego,
for I cannot have the experiences of someone else; the other is, accord-
ing to Husserl, a modified I. Just as a painted landscape is not a real
landscape, to make a comparison with Twardowski's use of the term
modification, so another I is not a real I (for me); even so, it is recog-
nized as the image of an ego. I perceive the body of the other ego, but
I only apperceive his states of mind, that is, 1 perceive those states of
mind along with my perceptions of his body [Husserl 1987, § 44, 52).
It is on the basis of empathy (Einfühlung) that it is possible to under-
stand another ego and his assertions. Because my living body is a cen-
tre of orientation it is essentially a here, whereas the body of someone
else (Körper) has the mode of a there. Because my living body is essen-
tially a moving and acting body, I can change my position so that I can
make every there into a here, and my here into a there; this means that
space is decentralized [Husserl 1987, § 53].4 Through this notion of
change of position (Stellungswechsel), we are able to make sense of
Husserl's rather short remark on indexicality in his Formal and Trans-
cendental Logic:
"Man beachte z. B. das ungeheure Reich der okkasionellen Urteile,
die doch auch ihre intersubjektive Wahrheit und Falschheit haben.
Sie beruht offenbar darauf, daß das ganze tägliche Leben des Ein-
zelnen und der Gemeinschaft auf eine typische Gleichartigkeit der
Situationen bezogen ist, derart daß jeder, der in die Situation ein-
tritt, als normaler Mensch eo ipso die ihr zugehörigen und allgemein-
samen Situationshorizonte hat. Man kann diese Horizonte nachträg-
lich explizieren, aber die konstituierende Horizontintentionalität,
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durch die die Umwelt des täglichen Lebens überhaupt Erfahrungs-
welt ist, ist immer früher als die Auslegung des Reflektierenden; und
sie ist es, die den Sinn der okkasionellen Urteile wesentlich be-
stimmt, immer und weit über das hinaus, was jeweils in den Worten
selbst ausdrücklich und bestimmt gesagt ist und gesagt werden
kann." [Husserl 1974, § 80J
Summarized, Husserl says that indexical judgments are intersubjective-
ly true or false, because our daily life has reference to a typical similari-
ty of situations, so that whoever enters into such a situation has, as
a normal human being, the horizon which belongs to this situation.
Through the horizonal intentionality our surrounding world of daily
life can be said to be the world we experience as being real. This is
what gives meaning to our occasional judgments.
IV HUSSERL'S THEORY APPLIED TO THE QUESTION OF
COGNITIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF INDEXICAL SENTENCES
At the beginning of this paper, I tried to make the notion of cogni-
tive significance clearer by using Frege's identity-criterion for proposi-
tions. According to this criterion, it is easy to explain why the sen-
tences (1) and (2), the 'I'- and the 'she'-sentence, differ in cognitive val-
ue. But the criterion says nothing about the third sentence, the 'you'-
sentence, expressed by my friend, in relation to the other two; the crite-
rion speaks only of one judging person.
There is in Frege's writings a tension between his identity-criterion,
on the one hand, and his idea that 'Today is fine,' uttered on the 22th
of June 1994, and 'Yesterday was fine,' uttered on the 23rd of June
1994, express the same thought or proposition. It is very possible for
someone to judge the former to be true, and the latter to be false; it is
always possible to lose track of a day.
What is needed in order that it is no longer possible that someone
judges the first sentence to be true and the second to be false? Is it nec-
essary that the judging person, or someone who listens to him, has
complete knowledge of the context in order to fully understand what is
said? Do we have to know that 'Yesterday' stands for the 22th of June
in order to understand the sentence 'Yesterday was fine' as uttered in
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the context described? Intuitively, we might say, that the 22th of June
must at least be apprehended as the day before, as the day which pre-
cedes the day on which the sentence 'Yesterday was fine' is uttered.
Complete knowledge of the context is not necessary. In the example of
my friend making a telephone-call with me, I need not have any specif-
ic knowledge of the place where he calls from, that it is Singapore, in
order to get his message. And I need not know what time it is in order
to get the message of my friend who is warning me by saying 'You are
in danger now.' But complete knowledge of the context is also not suf-
ficient to get the message. I need to know that the time of warning is
now, and I need to know that the person addressed is me. What is
needed is special knowledge of the time and place referred to, and sim-
ilar knowledge of the person addressed: I have to know how the time,
place and person in question are related to me, here and now. Here,
I think, we can use Husserl's theory of indexicality.
Some American philosophers [Smith and Mclntyre 1982] have com-
pared Husserl's notion of horizon with the notion of possibility in possi-
ble world semantics. Husserl would probably have said in answer to
this that the possibilities in possible world semantics are just empty,
logical possibilities, where the actual world is just one possibility
among others. These possibilities, therefore, do not have much in com-
mon with the objectual correlates of the possible perceptions that be-
long as a horizon to the actual perception of an object.
For the purposes of indexicality, at least, I prefer to compare Hus-
serl's notion of horizon, or, to be more precise, that of situation-horizon,
with the notion of context. A situation-horizon contains a person with
a here and now, and refers to other situations, where that person has
another point of reference. A situation-horizon is necessarily tied to an
experiencing person whose living body is the zero-point of reference.
Here we can see the main difference from the notion of context as it
functions in Kaplan's system, where the context is an objective notion,
conceptually unrelated to any judging or living person. For example,
now and here are not especially indicated. This objective notion of
context, competely unrelated to a person, is implied by Kaplan's logic
which essentially is a possible world semantics with an objective sys-
tem of times and places.
A sentence like 'He is taller than you are' makes sense only if the
l
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speaker apprehends a third person and the person addressed, whether
he perceives them or mentally apprehends them. Besides, the person
addressed must be apprehended as related to me in a special way; the
same holds for the apprehension of the third person: he must be appre-
hended as 'third person.' In so far as these perceptions are intrinsically
related to other perceptions, they create a surrounding space, relating
the addressee and the third person (over there), and both of them to
me. Personal pronouns express relational concepts which exist only
with reference to each other, as Gurwitsch says [Gurwitsch 1977, pp.
123, 124].
How is it possible for me, the addressee, to understand the speaker
and get his message? I apprehend the one who is speaking to me as
a living body with a zero-point of reference of its own, such that
I could be in his situation. I apprehend the sounds he utters as words
and his facial expressions and bodily movements as signs. Along with
these perceptions, in perceiving these signs, I apprehend what the
speaker is pointing at and who he is addressing, by empathy. It should
not be forgotten that these apperceptions are not real perceptions. I es-
sentially cannot have the other person's perceptual acts, but I can
imagine having an act of the same type by imagining myself to be in
a similar situation. In order to understand a 'you'-sentence or a 'there'-
sentence uttered by someone who addresses me, I have to relate his
point of reference to my point of reference, so that a 'you' becomes an
'I.' and a 'there' becomes a 'here.'
In the explanation given above, I acknowledge non-linguistic signs
such as facial expressions. When demonstratives are involved, it is
even more clear that we need non-linguistic signs, beside linguistic
signs, in order to get a message, in order to apprehend the cognitive
significance of what is said. For example, someone says in my pres-
ence: 'That is the house where I was born,' standing before a certain
house, and looking at it. In perceiving him as turned with his face to-
wards that house, I apperceive the act perception which has the house
as object. The facial expressions and the position and movements of
the body of the speaker function as signs, which, together with the
words he uses, form the language or medium by which I can under-
stand what he is saying, what his message is. Why should we merely
take linguistic signs into consideration? Even Frege allows non-linguis-
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tic signs in order to complete indexical sentences [see his 1976, pp.
64, 76].
Wolfgang Künne has a more extreme position [in his 1982 and
1992]. He says that the linguistic sign needs to be completed by the ob-
ject meant, so that we have what he calls 'hybrid proper names,' that
is, names consisting of a linguistic sign and the individual object itself.
My theory has the advantage over Künne's of explaining the informa-
tiveness of 'that man is that man,' 'you are you,' 'he is he' in appropri-
ate circumstances. These sentences need some supplementation of
non-linguistic signs; in order for the sentence 'he is he' to be informa-
tive, different non-linguistic signs should accompany the first and the
second 'he'-occurrence.
What is needed for communication to succeed is that I relate the sit-
uation the speaker is in with the situation I am in, in the right way;
through this exchange a 'you' becomes an 'I,' and an 'I' becomes
a 'you,' a 'here' a 'there,' and a 'there' a 'here.' What is needed for re-
tainment of belief is that I relate the situation I was in before with the
situation I am in now, in the appropriate way, so that 'today,' that is,
the word used yesterday, becomes 'yesterday,' and 'tomorrow' becomes
'today.'
Are we able now to explain the cognitive value of indexical sen-
tences, such that the cognitive significance can be constant and comu-
nication can be explained even when indexicals are used? We might
add, as a presupposition, to Frege's identity-criterion that the judging
person should not only understand the words used, but that he also
should apprehend the relations between the different situations: the re-
lation of myself to a speaker, addressee, and third person; the relation
of now to earlier and later times; and the relation of here to other
places surrounding it. This kind of knowledge is no longer linguistic,
but it is necessary in order to utter and understand sentences with in-
dexical terms and indexical verbs like 'to come' and 'to go.' This im-
plies that linguistic and non-linguistic knowledge are on a par, or at
least not so far apart from each other as we always have thought.
.
•
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NOTES
(1) Other criticism on the notion of character as cognitive signifi-
cance is given by Felicia Ackerman [Ackerman 1989]: the notion of
character does not explain the informativeness of 'Cicero is Cicero' or
'you are you' (in appropriate circumstances).
(2) My notion of information differs from that used by Perry in [his
1977]; for Perry, sentences with the same content contain the same in-
formation.
(3) Kaplan deals with the topic of belief-reports, see for example
chapter xx in [Kaplan 1989a],
(4) These ideas are also put forward by Evans and Charles Taylor
[Evans 1982, p. 156]
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